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Abstract
We investigate the conditions under which multiple equilibria due to
coordination failure can be ruled out when individual agents have noisy signals
about the fundamentals of an economy. Morris and Shin (1998) study a model of
currency crisis where, with common knowledge of fundamentals, self-fulfilling
currency attacks lead to multiple equilibria. They show that even a small
amount of noise about fundamentals yields a unique equilibrium. The insights
generated by their paper extends to other market situations where multiple
equilibria may exist due to coordination failures.
Our purpose here is to address this challenge to models with self-fulfilling
multiple equilibria by studying the robustness of the uniqueness result with noisy
signals about fundamentals. We show that even with noisy signals on the quality
of a bank’s assets multiple equilibria exist in models of banking. We argue that
the conditions under which this happens arise naturally in models of banking. In
particular, when the proportion of early withdrawal is high, a bank may decide
to defend itself by liquidating some of its long-term assets or borrowing from the
outside third party to pay for withdrawal demand. Under these circumstances,
we show that banks will decide to collapse regardless of fundamentals when (a)
the credit rationing in the market for bank loans is severe, (b) the cost of bank
loans is high, or (c) there is a high cost of early liquidation. In all these cases,
multiple equilibria persist.
Further, we show that our model of banking can be derived as a reduced form
version of Diamond and Dybvig (1983)’s model of banking.
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1Non-Technical Summary
The occurrence of financial crises; either currency crises or bank runs, are
often explained using economic models which exhibit multiple self-fulfilling
equilibria. In these models, beliefs are self-fulfilling in nature as speculators’
belief of the occurrence of a certain event and their actions in anticipation
of such belief precipitate the event itself. Recently, Morris and Shin (1998)
have challenged this point of view by showing how in a model of currency
crisis imperfectly observed fundamentals yields a unique equilibrium where a
crisis is certain when the fundamentals are lower than a specific critical value
of the fundamentals.
In our paper, we examine this challenge in the model of banking where
economic fundamentals aﬀect both the returns to the bank’s asset and the
minimum size of the bank below which banking collapses. In contrast to
Goldstein and Pauzner (1999) and Morris and Shin (2000)), we show that
even with noisy signals on fundamentals, multiple equilibria may persist. Our
result requires that for any value of banking fundamentals, bank runs is a
possible outcome.
Are the conditions under which bank runs occur for any value of banking
fundamentals economically relevant? We answer this question in two ways.
First, we examine the optimal decision of banks when faced with a run on its
assets. We show that banks will decide to collapse regardless of fundamentals
when (a) the credit rationing in the market for bank loans is severe, (b) the
cost of bank loans is high, or (c) there is a high cost of early liquidation. In
all these cases, the stable region is empty.
Second, by reinterpreting fundamentals to represent an exogenous liquid-
ity shock, we show that our model of banking can be derived as a reduced
form version of Diamond and Dybvig (1983) where a certain proportion of
the bank’s assets are always illiquid. It is this feature that makes banks
inherently vulnerable to bank runs, thus ensuring that the stable region is
empty.
Models with unique equilibrium can have diﬀerent policy implications
from those with multiple equilibria. One implication of Morris and Shin
(1998) (see also Morris and Shin (1999a)), is that the onset of a crisis should
be anticipated as the fundamentals evolve to approach the critical value
needed to trigger a speculative attack. On the other hand, our main result
implies that a financial crisis should be largely unanticipated by markets. A
related issue is on the role of policy interventions that prevent a crisis. Our
2main result here suggests a role for policy interventions that coordinate the
expectations of traders on the ‘right’ equilibrium. In addition, our results
suggest that suspension of convertibility, restrictions on capital flows, lenders
of last resort can be rationalised as policy interventions that prevent runs due
to self-fulfilling expectations.
1 Introduction
We investigate the conditions under which multiple equilibria due to coor-
dination failure can be ruled out when individual agents have noisy signals
about the fundamentals of an economy. Morris and Shin (1998) study a
model of currency crisis where, with common knowledge of fundamentals,
self-fulfilling currency attacks lead to multiple equilibria. They show that
even a small amount of noise about fundamentals yields a unique equilib-
rium1. The insights generated by their paper extends to other market situa-
tions where multiple equilibria may exist due to coordination failures. These
insights present a major challenge to any attempts that seek to explain either
currency attacks (as in Obstfeld (1986)) or bank runs (as in Diamond-Dybvig
(1983)) using models with self-fulfilling multiple equilibria. Indeed, Jeanne
and Masson (2000), using a model with multiple equilibria to study the
experience of the French franc from 1987-1994, explicitly acknowledge the
criticism of their approach implied by the uniqueness result in Morris and
Shin (1998).
Our purpose here is to address this challenge to models with self-fulfilling
multiple equilibria by studying the robustness of the uniqueness result with
noisy signals about fundamentals.
We change the original context of Morris and Shin (1998) paper from
currency crisis to banking. We can justify this as follows. First, ever since
Diamond and Dybvig’s seminal (1983) paper, the phenomena of bank runs
arising out of coordination failure has been extensively studied2. realising
several authors have applied the methodology developed by Morris and Shin
(1998) to models of banking (see for example, Goldstein and Pauzner (1999),
1For further applications of this uniqueness result, see Corsetti, Morris and Shin (1999)
who use it to study the vulnerability of a country to speculative attacks in the presence of
large traders, Morris and Shin (1999a) who use it provide a theory of the onset of currency
crisis and Morris and Shin (1999b) who use this result to study the way debt pricing can
incorporate the risk due to coordination failure.
2See for instance Freixas and Rochet (1998) and the references contained therein.
3Morris and Shin (2000)). Like these papers here, we also study a model
of banking where the banking fundamentals aﬀect both the returns to the
bank’s asset and the minimum size of the bank. This guarantees that multiple
equilibria exist in our model due to a coordination failure among depositors
when these banking fundamentals are common knowledge.
However, unlike these authors, we obtain very diﬀerent results. We show,
using our model, that even with noisy signals on fundamentals, multiple equi-
libria may persist. To obtain our results, we do away with a key assumption
in Morris and Shin (1998). Applied to our model of banking this assumption
implies that with complete information, the space of fundamentals can be
partitioned into three non-empty subsets, an unstable region where the bank
always fails, a middle region in which there is multiple equilibria and a stable
region where the bank always survives. Assuming all three regions are non-
empty, a small noise in the observation of the true value of the fundamentals,
implies that it can never be common knowledge that fundamentals are in the
middle region. It is this feature that is crucial for the uniqueness result in
Morris and Shin (1998) to go through. In fact, Morris and Shin (2000), fol-
lowing Goldstein and Pazner (1999), develop a model of banking where all
the three regions of fundamentals are non-empty and show the existence of
a unique equilibrium with noisy signals on fundamentals.
In our analysis we do away with the assumption that all these regions
are non-empty and show that, in contrast, multiple equilibria exist even
with noisy signals on the fundamentals of banking. We study two diﬀerent
cases where this assumption no longer holds. In the first case, we assume
that both the stable and the unstable regions are empty. In this case, even
with noisy signals on fundamentals, it remains common knowledge that these
fundamentals are in the middle region. From this it follows that both bank
runs and bank survival continue to remain equilibrium outcomes. This case
serves as a useful benchmark for our main result. In order to prove this result,
we investigate the less restrictive case when only the stable region is assumed
to be empty. In this case, even with noisy signals on fundamentals, it remains
common knowledge that the fundamentals lie in either the unstable or in the
middle region. Under this assumption, we show that when the fundamentals
fall below a certain critical value, the bank always fails, but above that
same critical value, both self-fulfilling bank runs and bank survival remain
equilibrium outcomes.
Is the case with an empty stable region economically relevant? The case
for an empty stable region as shown in section 3 can be justified in two ways.
4First, we examine the optimal decision of banks when faced with a potential
collapse and derive endogenously the assumption of an empty stable region.
When the proportion of early withdrawal is high, a bank may decide to defend
itself by liquidating some of its long-term assets or borrowing from the outside
third party to pay for withdrawal demand. Under these circumstances, we
show that banks will decide to collapse regardless of fundamentals when (a)
the credit rationing in the market for bank loans is severe, (b) the cost of
bank loans is high, or (c) there is a high cost of early liquidation. In all these
cases, the stable region is empty.
Second, a minimum size of the bank which is bounded away from zero
can also be justified if the bank’s asset portfolio has illiquid assets. By
reinterpreting fundamentals to represent an exogenous liquidity shock, we
show that our model of banking can be derived as a reduced form version
of Diamond and Dybvig (1983)’s model of banking where the proportion of
illiquid assets is derived endogenously.
In the final section of the paper, we discuss some empirical and policy
issues that arise from our analysis. One implication of Morris and Shin (1998)
(see also Morris and Shin (1999a)), is that the onset of a crisis should be
anticipated as the fundamentals evolve to approach the critical value needed
to trigger a speculative attack. On the other hand, our main result implies
that a financial crisis should be largely unanticipated by markets. In fact,
a wide array of empirical papers that supports the view that episodes of
financial and currency crisis are largely unanticipated. A related issue is on
the role of policy interventions that prevent a crisis. Our main result here
suggests a role for policy interventions that coordinate the expectations of
traders on the “right” equilibrium. In contrast to Morris and Shin (1998),
our results suggest that suspension of convertibility, restrictions on capital
flows, lenders of last resort can be rationalized as policy interventions that
prevent runs due to self-fulfilling expectations.
In the next section we present the model of banking and characterize its
equilibria with and without noisy signals on fundamentals. Section 4 discuss
empirical and policy issues. The last section concludes.
2 Banking with noisy signals
There are three time periods, t = 0, 1, 2. In each period there is a single
perishable good xt. There is a continuum of identical depositors, indexed
5by i, of Lebesgue measure 1, each endowed with one unit of the perishable
good at time period t = 0. Depositors preferences are identical and are
summarized by the utility function u(x0, x1, x2) = x1 + x2.
In addition, there is a bank endowed with a non-convex technology that
converts the inputs of the perishable good at t = 0 to outputs of the per-
ishable good at t = 1 or t = 2. Depositors choose whether to invest their
endowment of the perishable with the bank at t = 0.
Let θ represent the fundamentals of banking. As we discuss in section 3,
we can interpret θ as either representing the quality of a bank’s assets or an




Both the returns and the minimum size of the bank depend on θ. In order
to simplify the analysis, we take this dependence on θ as exogenously deter-
mined in this section of the paper. We postpone an endogenous derivation
of the dependence of the minimum size on θ to section 3.
One unit of the consumption good invested in t = 0 yields either one
unit of the good in t = 1 or r(θ), units of the consumption good in period
t = 2, if the proportion of deposits with the bank is at least as great as a(θ).
Otherwise the bank fails at t = 1 and yields nothing at t = 2. Here, Further,
at each θ, a(θ) is a minimum size requirement: if the proportion of deposits
falls below a(θ), the bank is no longer viable at t = 1.
Given the specification of preferences, without loss of generality we may
assume that a depositor will choose to invest in the bank at t = 0. This
is because no depositor has access to the technology in period t = 0 and
derives no utility from consuming the commodity in period t = 0. However,
by allowing depositors to withdraw their deposits before the asset matures,
we are able to capture the maturity mismatch with demand deposit contracts.
We study the equilibrium outcomes in two diﬀerent versions of this model.
In Version 1, as in Diamond and Dybvig (1983), the fundamentals of
banking are common knowledge. The sequence of events is as follows. In
t = 0, depositors invest in the bank before they observe θ. In period t = 1,
the true value of θ is realized according to the uniform distribution overh
θ, θ
i
. All depositors observe θ. Depositors then decide whether to withdraw
or continue their investments in the bank. If they withdraw, they get back
the one unit of the commodity. If they continue to invest, they get back r(θ)
at t = 2 if the bank survives. Otherwise, they get nothing. As remarked
before, without loss of generality we may assume that all depositors will
choose to invest in the bank at t = 0. This allows us to focus on the game
6that depositors play at t = 1, when θ is observed by all depositors. In this
game, a depositor chooses an action from {withdraw, not withdraw}. A
profile of actions is a Nash equilibrium if no individual depositor has an
incentive to deviate.
Let θus = {θ|r(θ) < 1}, with θs = {θ|r(θ) ≥ 1 and a(θ) = 0}. Let
θm= {θ|r(θ) ≥ 1 and 0 < a(θ) < 1}. The following remark is immediate and
is stated without proof.
Remark 1 In Version 1 of the model, for each θ ∈ θus(resp., for each
θ ∈ θs) there is a unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium where all depositors
choose to withdraw (resp. choose not to withdraw) while for each θ ∈ θm,
there are two pure strategy Nash equilibria, one where all depositors choose
{not withdraw}and another where all depositors choose {withdraw}.
This remark justifies our interpretation of θus as the unstable region where
the bank always collapses and θs as the stable region where the bank always
survives. θm is the middle region where the there are two equilibrium out-
comes: one where the bank always survives and another where the bank
always fails. This is the region with self-fulfilling multiple equilibria: the
first equilibrium is the one where the bank always survives and the second
equilibrium is the one where there is a bank run and represents a coordination
failure. As we shall show, whether or not these three regions are non-empty
is the key to characterizing equilibria with noisy signals on fundamentals.
Next we study Version 2 where depositors no longer observe the quality
of the bank’s assets, θ, at t = 1 but instead receive a noisy signal about
it. The timing of events is exactly as before except that now at t = 1,
depositors cannot observe θ but instead observe a signal y which is drawn




, where Y (θ) = [θ − ε, θ + ε]
if θ ∈ [θ + ε, θ − ε], where ε > 0 is the term representing noise in the
fundamentals; Y (θ) = [θ, θ+ε] if θ ∈ [θ, θ+ε); Y (θ) = [θ−ε, θ] if θ ∈ (θ−ε, θ]3.
A strategy for a depositor at t = 1 is a function from what he observes to
his set of actions which has two components {withdraw, not withdraw}. A
profile of strategies is a Bayesian equilibrium if no individual depositor has
an incentive to deviate. Consider the strategy profile where every depositor
withdraws if and only if observed signal y is less than y¯. Such a strategy
profile is called a strategy profile with a switching point y¯.
3This signalling structure is the same as in Morris and Shin (1998). We use this
signalling structure to maintain comparability with their results.
7In the remaining part of this section, we study the equilibria of Version
2 of this model.
Remark 2 Assume r(θ) is continuous and strictly increasing in θ while a(θ)




. If θus,θs,θm are all
non-empty, then for a suitable choice of ε > 0 there exists a unique Bayesian
equilibrium in strategies with a switching point y∗. In particular, there exists
a unique value of θ, denoted by θ∗, such that the bank fails if θ < θ∗ and
survives if θ > θ∗.
Proof. Follows from Morris and Shin (1998).
This remark shows that when the space of fundamentals can be par-
titioned into three non-empty subsets, the first region in which the bank
always fails, a second region in which there is multiple equilibria and a third
region in which the bank always survives, the unique equilibrium result of
Morris and Shin (1998) applies to our model as well. When all three regions
are non-empty, a small noise in the observation of the true value of the funda-
mentals, implies that it can never be common knowledge that fundamentals
are in θm. Morris and Shin’s proof then goes through in our case with a
suitable relabelling of variables.
In contrast, the next proposition provides a set of conditions under which
multiple equilibria persist even with noisy signals on fundamentals.





and θus are empty. Then, multiple equilibria exist and in particular self-
fulfilling bank runs exist.
Proof. If it is common knowledge that θs and θus are empty, for θ ∈
[θ + ε, θ − ε], where ε > 0, at each y ∈ [θ − ε, θ + ε], it remains common
knowledge that θ ∈ θm. The same remains true when θ ∈ [θ, θ + ε) and
θ ∈ (θ − ε, θ]. Therefore, conditional on θ, at every signal y ∈ Y (θ), it is
common knowledge that θ ∈ θm. Therefore, the strategy profile where each
depositor chooses {not withdraw} at each y is an equilibrium. Further, the
strategy profile where each depositor chooses {withdraw} at each y is an
equilibrium.
Proposition 1 serves as a benchmark case because it specifies the key
common knowledge restrictions for the existence of multiple equilibrium out-
comes. In the benchmark case, the assumption is that θus, the region where
8the bank always fails and θs, region where the bank always survives, are
both empty. Under this assumption, even with noisy signals on fundamen-
tals, it remains common knowledge that the fundamentals are in θm. From
this it follows that both bank runs and bank survival continue to remain
equilibrium outcomes. For θus to be empty we need that r(θ) ≥ 1. This is
restrictive as it assumes that the quality of the asset portfolio of the bank
always guarantees a high enough return at t = 2.
In the next proposition, we make the weaker assumption that only θs is
empty. We show that even with this weaker assumption, multiple equilibria
exist.
Before we state the next proposition, we need the following definitions
(see also Morris and Shin (1998)). Let π(y) be the aggregate proportion
of deposits not withdrawn in period 1 when the value of signal is y. Let
s (θ, π) be the realized proportion of deposits not withdrawn in period 1
when the state of the fundamentals is θ, given π. Under our assumptions,
when θ ∈ [θ + ε, θ − ε],





Further, for θ ∈ [θ+ε, θ−ε], let u(y, π) be the expected payoﬀ of {not withdraw},
given signal y and π. We have






Note that when θ is close to θ or θ, in particular, when θ ∈ [θ, θ+ ε) and
θ ∈ (θ − ε, θ], the limits of the integrations must be adjusted.
Denote a strategy profile with a switching point y¯ by Iy and let u(y, Iy)
denotes the corresponding payoﬀ.
Proposition 4 Assume r(θ) is continuous and strictly increasing in θ while




. Suppose it is com-
mon knowledge that θ ∈ θm ∪ θus while θs is empty, then multiple equilibria
exist and in particular self-fulfilling bank runs exist.
9Proof. As it is common knowledge that θs is empty, then at every signal
y, it is common knowledge that θ ∈ θm ∪θus. Therefore a strategy profile in
which every depositor choose {withdraw} regardless of the signal value y is





all θ ∈ (θ∗, θ], in addition, {not withdraw} is also an equilibrium outcome.
First note that if π(y) ≥ π0(y) for all y, then u(y, π) ≥ u(y, π0) for all y and
u(y, Iy) is continuous and strictly increasing in y.This follows by arguments
analogous to lemma 1 and lemma 2 in Morris and Shin (1998). Further,
observe that for a suitable choice of ε, we have Y (θ) ⊂ θus while Y (θ¯) ⊂ θm.
Now, a depositor with a signal y ∈ Y (θ) knows that θ ∈ θus. Therefore, we
have u(y, Iy) < 1 if y¯ ∈ Y (θ). Next, a depositor with a signal y ∈ Y (θ¯), knows
that θ ∈ θm. For each θ ∈ θm, each depositor will choose {not withdraw} if
he expects that all other depositors will choose {not withdraw}. Therefore,
if every depositor expects every other depositor to choose {not withdraw}, as
there is a continuum of depositors, for an individual depositor with a signal





that u(y∗, Iy∗) = 1. Also, y∗ /∈ Y (θ) and y∗ /∈ Y (θ¯). In words, a depositor
with signal y will choose {withdraw} if y ≤ y∗ and {not withdraw} if y > y∗.
Now, when the equilibrium strategy is Iy∗, s(θ, Iy∗) is strictly increasing in
θ ∈ (y∗ − ε, y∗ + ε). Further, when θ ∈ (y∗ − ε, y∗ + ε), 0 < s(θ, Iy∗) < 1
and at θ = y∗ − ε, s(θ, Iy∗) = 0 while at θ = y∗ + ε, s(θ, Iy∗) = 1. Further,
for a suitable choice of ε, when θ + 2ε ∈ θus, s(θ, Iy∗) is equal to zero. In
addition, s(θ, Iy∗) is continuous in θ and by assumption, a (θ) is continuous
and strictly decreasing in θ. Therefore, there is a unique value of θ such that
s(θ, Iy∗) = a (θ). Denote this by θ∗. Therefore, when θ < θ∗, the bank always
fails and when θ ≥ θ∗, the bank can either fail or survive.
3 Discussion of the model
So far in our analysis, we have taken as given the assumptions on the empti-
ness or non-emptiness of the regions θs, θus, θm. As we have already seen
in the previous section, especially proposition 2.2, the assumptions made on
the (non)emptiness of the regions θs, θus, θm are crucial. In this section, we
endogenize the assumption θs is empty.
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3.1 The return function and minimum size
In this section, we analyse in more detail the process in which bank failure
occurs and show that for some economies the bank may collapse regardless
of the value of the fundamentals θ.
To this end, we introduce a more complex return function r (θ,α) that
depends on both the fundamental θ and the proportion of deposit remaining
at the end of t = 1, denote by α. As before, we assume that r (θ,α) is
continuous, strictly increasing in its first argument θ; in addition, now we
asssume that it is continuous and strictly increasing in α as well. remark
that under this assumption, the argument presented in the previous section
is unaﬀected. Further, we require that for values of θ close to θ, r(θ,α) < 1,
regardless of the proportion of deposits remaining. In particular observe
that this guarantees that θus is non-empty. We also take as given that θm is
non-empty.
In what folows it will be convenient to fix the interpretation of θ as
representing the quality of the bank’s assets. We have in mind a situation
where the bank in question is a regional monopoly with both its assets and
liabilities specific to that region. The fundamentals θ now represent shocks
that are idiosyncratic to the region in which the bank operates itself.
Suppose at t = 1, after observing θ, a proportion 1 − α, 0 ≤ α ≤ 1, of
depositors decide to withdraw from the bank. The bank will have to liquidate
a proportion 1− α of its assets in order to satisfy the withdrawal demand4.
When r (θ,α) ≥ 1 the bank will survive to t = 2. When r (θ,α) < 1 the bank
will fail at t = 1. Here we analyse the action of the bank when faced with
a possible collapse. If the return r (θ,α) < 1 the bank has a choice between
two actions, labelled A and NA. Action A denotes the choice to defend the
bank. Action NA denotes the choice of not doing anything to prevent the
bank from collapsing. When the action NA is chosen, the bank collapses at
t = 1, and a payoﬀ equal to zero is obtained by the bank. If action A is
chosen, it can defend itself by borrowing from the outside third party or via
early liquidation of its assets.
Denote the amount that the bank decides to borrow at t = 1 by γ. If the
bank borrows γ to satisfy some of its withdrawal demand, it will only need
to liquidate δ = 1 − α − γ of its assets. Therefore at the end of t = 1 the
amount of deposits remaining with the bank is α+ γ. The net return in this
4This is the case when the salvage value of production at t = 1 is the initial investment.
Later this assumption is relaxed.
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case is given by
r (θ,α+ γ)− c (γ)
where c (γ) is assumed to be continuous and strictly increasing in γ, and
reflecting the costs of borrowing. The per capita return is assumed to be
increasing in θ,α and γ.The bank will choose action A if
r (θ,α+ γ)− c (γ) ≥ 1
and action NA if
r (θ,α+ γ)− c (γ) < 1
We first show that the minimum size requirement a (θ) is continuous and
strictly decreasing in θ. a (θ) is the value of α which solves r (θ, ρ(α+ γ))−
c (γ) = 1. Denote R (θ,α, γ) = r (θ, ρ(α+ γ))− c (γ). Consider θ0 < θ00 such
that R(θ0, a (θ0) , γ (θ0, a (θ0))) = 1 and R(θ00, a (θ00) , γ (θ00, a (θ00))) = 1. By
assumption, as R (θ,α, γ) is increasing in θ and α, this implies that when
θ0 < θ00, a (θ0) > a (θ00). Therefore a (θ) is strictly decreasing in θ. Continuity
of a (θ) follows from continuity of r (θ, ρ(α+ γ)) and c (γ).
Next, we argue that when banks are faced with severe rationing, high
cost of borrowing or high cost of early liquidation they may decide to collapse
regardless of fundamentals θ. This may be true for banks in emerging market
economies with weak financial system. In such economies, θs is empty.
We examine the optimal decision of the bank under three diﬀerent sce-
narios.
3.1.1 Credit rationing
Here we show that when there is severe credit rationing in market for bank
loans, the stable region θs is empty. In fact, credit rationing is observed in
most financial markets and in particular, in the market for bank loans (see for
instance, Guttentag and Herring (1987)). We can rationalize credit rationing
in our set-up by observing that the market may not be able distinguish
between banks that borrow to ward oﬀ a liquidity threat and banks that
borrow because they are insolvent. This can be justified in our model if the
potential creditors of the bank cannot verifiably observe θ. Potential lenders
faced with uncertainty may ration the borrower instead of raising the rate to
12
cover a greater potential for loss especially, when as in our case, the solvency
of potential borrowers is not observed. Therefore, there can be a limit on
the amount the bank can borrow above which the cost of borrowing will be
infinite. Denote the limit on borrowing by γ and let γθ (α) be the value of γ
such that
r (θ,α+ γθ (α))− c (γθ (α)) = 1
We shall assume that rationing by the markets is severe i.e. γθ(0) > γ. Then,
remark that there exists α such that γθ (α) > γ and the bank will collapse.
Let αθ be the value of α such that γθ (α) = γ. Therefore, for any given θ, if
α < αθ the bank will collapse. Under our assumption, γθ (α) is decreasing
in θ. Therefore, ∀θ, there exists α > 0 such that α ≤ αθ. This implies that
there exists α < α such that the bank will collapse regardless of θ ⇒ θs is
empty.
3.1.2 The cost of borrowing
Apart from the fact that banks may have limited access to credits, troubled
banks, especially when its solvency is not observed, may also be subjected
to high rate of interest for loans. Also the costs of borrowing does not
only reflect the loan rates but among other things, the transaction cost and
more importantly the cost to its reputation. In order to borrow it will have
to convince the market that it is solvent. This, in itself, will damage its
reputation as being a worthy borrower and therefore, aﬀect the terms on
which it will be able to borrow in any future crisis5.
Consider the case when all depositors wish to withdraw, α = 0. The
amount of deposits remaining at the end of t = 1 will be γ the amount that
it borrows from the markets, and the per capita return will be r (θ, γ)−c (γ).
Again, the bank will choose to collapse, action NA if r (θ, γ)− c (γ) < 1. Let
assume that the cost of borrowing is high such that
r (θ, 1)− c (1) < 1, ∀θ.
5As Bagehot (1873) noted ‘Every banker knows that if he has to prove that he is
worthy of credit, however good maybe his argument, in fact his credit is gone...’. (quoted
in Guttentag and Herring (1987)).
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Therefore when α = 0 and γ = 1 the bank will always choose to collapse. By
continuity of r (θ,α+ γ) and c (γ) in α and γ, there exist eαθ close to 0 andeγθ close to 1 such that
r (θ,α+ γ)− c (γ) < 1,∀α < eαθ, ∀γ > eγθ
Therefore, ∀θ, there exists eα > 0 such that eα ≤ eαθ. This implies that
there exists α < α such that the bank will collapse regardless of θ ⇒ θs is
empty.
3.1.3 The cost of early liquidation
Previously, we assume that the salvage value of production at t = 1 is equal to
the initial investment. Now, we will relax this assumption and assume that
the production technology is such that if interrupted at t = 1, its salvage
value will be less than the initial investment and the bank will be left with
a proportion ρ (α+ γ) , ρ < 1. The cost of early liquidation may reflect the
fact that the secondary market for bank loans remains thin as loans are not
perfectly marketable and there exists a lemon type problem for bank loans.
This, in turn, implies that the bank will incur a cost as the value of loans
are heavily discounted by potential buyers (for a more detailed discussion on
this point, see Guttentag and Herring (1987)).The per capita return is given
by
r (θ, ρ(α+ γ))− c (γ)
Consider the case when α = 0. The amount of deposits remaining at the
end of t = 1 is ργ, the per capita return will be r (θ, ργ)− c (γ). Let assume
that the cost of early liquidation is high such that when α = 0,
r (θ, 1)− c (1/ρ) < 1,∀θ
Remark that as long as ρ > 1, this assumption is less severe that requiring
that r (θ, 1)− c (1) < 1,∀θ. It follows that when α = 0 the bank will always
choose to collapse. By continuity of α and γ, there exist eαθ close to 0 andeγθ close to 1/ρ such that
r (θ, ρ(α+ γ))− c (γ) < 1, ∀α < eαθ,∀γ > eγθ
Therefore, ∀θ, there exists eα > 0 such that eα ≤ eαθ. This implies that
there exists α < α such that the bank will collapse regardless of θ ⇒ θs is
empty.
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3.2 Liquidity shocks and minimum size
In this section, we argue that typically a certain proportion of the bank’s
assets are always illiquid and this feature makes banks inherently vulnerable
to bank runs, thus ensuring that θs is empty. We reinterpret fundamentals
of banking as liquidity shocks and show that the model of banking presented
in section 2 can be derived as a reduced form of the monopoly bank model
of Diamond and Dybvig (1983) (hereafter D-D) where the proportion of the
bank’s assets that are illiquid is derived endogenously.
In (D-D), bank can achieve optimal risk sharing to its customers by of-
fering demand deposit contract which transform illiquid assets into liquid
liabilities. There are three time periods, T = 0, 1, 2 and two type of agents:
type 1 (2) agent cares only about consumption in T = 1 (T = 2). Each agent
has a utility function of the form
U(c1, c2;Θ) = u (c1) if j is of type 1 in state Θ
= ρu (c1 + c2) if j is of type 2 in state Θ
where Θ represents the state private information. At T = 0 all agents are
identical and will choose to deposit with the bank. At T = 1 agents privately
learn their type and make a choice between withdrawing and remaining with
the bank. At T = 2 returns on production are realised and divided between
the remaining depositors. In addition, both D-D and our models assume
long term production technology with a cost of early liquidation. Demand
deposit contract however oﬀers liquid liabilities with a fixed interest rate r1
at T = 1,(r1 is greater than the value of early liquidation of assets). In
D-D r1 is derived from optimal risk sharing when the proportion of type 1
depositor, t ∈ (0, 1), is known ex ante and r1 is strictly decreasing in t6.
The return on investments at T = 2, r2 if the bank is not bankrupt depends
on r1, the fraction of deposits withdrawn at T = 1, f and R which is a
constant representing a fixed return from long term production in period 2,
r2 = R(1− r1f)/(1− f).
The fraction of type 1 depositors, t, in D-D can be interpreted as rep-




, θ > 0, θ < 1.
Thus r2 represents r (θ) in our model and for any given level of deposits
withdrawn, r (θ) is increasing in θ and r(θ) > 1 when the demand deposit
contract is chosen optimally.
6The fact that the return in period 1 is greater than one is inessential since in Diamond
and Dybvig (1983) bank runs occur even when the return is 1
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In D-D, it shown (pages 410-411) that there exists an upper bound of the
fraction of deposits withdrawn at T = 1 that allows banking to continue to
T = 2. If the realised fraction of deposits withdrawn at T = 1, w, is equal to
this upper bound, denoted by w = (R−r1)/r1(R−1), the rates of returns for
both periods will be the optimally chosen interest rate at T = 1, r1. If it is
greater the bank will fail because all type 2 depositors will rush to withdraw
their deposits. Since the minimum size requirement is the lowest possible
proportion of deposits remaining in period 2 that permits the ongoing of
production, the minimum size a (θ) is equal to 1−w. The upper bound w is
a function of r1 and it is increasing in θ, the fraction of type 1 deposits. Thus
a (θ) is decreasing in θ and a (θ) > 0 if θ ∈ (0, 1). Therefore θs is empty.
Note that using the formula described in D-D, θ > 0, implies that a(θ) < 1.
Thus it is in fact common knowledge that θus is empty as well provided that
r(θ) > 1.
Given the specifications of D-D, we have shown that the following prop-




, θ > 0, θ < 1.
Therefore, it is common knowledge that θ ∈ θm even when there is noisy
observation of fundamentals. It follows that multiple equilibria always exist.
However, note that “narrow banks” (Fama (1985), Goodhart (1987), Wal-
lace (1996)), where the bank is required to back demand deposits entirely by
safe short-term assets are not vulnerable to runs. Wallace (1996) argues that
requiring “narrow banks” may imply that socially optimal risk-sharing will
not be implemented by the banking system. Our model rules out “narrow
banks”. Our main result suggests that there is a discontinuity in the transi-
tion from “narrow banks” to banks with a “small” maturity mismatch and a
minimum size requirement due to a non-convex banking technology. In this
case, multiple equilibria persist.
4 Empirical and policy issues
In our model of banking, a crisis will occur if the fundamentals are weak
enough i.e. when θ ∈ [θ, θ∗]. It can also occur as a result of a shift of
expectation even when the fundamentals are sound i.e. θ ∈ (θ∗, θ¯]. Therefore,
our model is able to explain both fundamental based bank runs and panic
runs. Indeed for a certain range of fundamentals, multiple equilibria exist
even with noisy signals about the fundamentals. This has applications to the
study of specific episodes of financial collapse and currency crisis such as the
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recent Asian financial crisis or the earlier Mexican Peso crisis in 1994. In our
model of banking,
As pointed out by Thomas (1999), one implication of Morris and Shin
(1998) (see also Morris and Shin (1999a)), is that the onset of a crisis should
be anticipated as the fundamentals evolve to approach the critical value
needed to trigger a speculative attack On the other hand, our main result,
that there is a region of fundamentals with multiple equilibrium outcomes,
implies that a financial crisis should be largely unanticipated by markets. In
fact, Edwards (1986), using international data on the pricing of bank loans to
developing countries, finds that international financial markets had only par-
tially anticipated the debt crisis of 1982. Several empirical studies of other
episodes of financial and currency crisis make a similar claim. Examples
include Rose and Svensson (1994) on the crisis in currencies in the Euro-
pean exchange rate mechanism, Jeanne (1997) (see also Jeanne and Masson
(2000)) on the experience of the French franc from 1987-1994, Flood and
Marion (2000) on the crisis in the Mexican Peso in 1994.
Furthermore, the severity and contagion eﬀects of the crisis is certainly
unaccounted for purely by economic fundamentals. Several recent papers on
the Asian financial crisis collected in Agenor et al (1999))7 argue that the
phenomenon of contagion, where a crisis in one economy triggers oﬀ a crisis in
another institutionally similar economy, can be usefully studied using models
of multiple equilibria. Masson (1997) concludes that there is a role for pure
contagion which is not linked to macroeconomic fundamentals and can only
occur in a situation in which multiple equilibria were possible.
The implications of our model for policies to prevent banking crises are
similar to that of other multiple equilibria models of banking. Chang and
Velasco (1998) apply the Diamond and Dybvig (1983) model of banking to the
study of the Asian financial crisis to show that, with fixed exchange rates,
domestic self-fulfilling bank crisis translates into a run on that country’s
currency (see Sachs, Tornell and Velasco (1996) for a related attempt to
explain the Mexico Peso crisis).Our analysis also suggests that the problem
of maturity mismatches can have a negative impact when capital markets
are liberalized in emerging economies. The problem of maturity mismatches
can be aggravated by financial liberalization and capital flows from abroad.
7In particular see chapters 1, 2, 8, 9 and 10 in Agenor et al (1999). For a dissenting
view, however, see the chapter by Morris and Shin (1999a) in the same volume where they
study the onset of currency attacks by looking at a dynamic extension of their 1998 paper
in which the fundamentals of the economy evolve stochastically over time.
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Indeed, the nature of demand deposit contracts and of banks assets coupled
with potentially large changes in financial flows ensure that a surprised run
resulting from refusals to roll over debt can always occur. Rogoﬀ (1999),
citing Diamond and Dybvig (1983), makes a similar point. Fischer (1999)
takes this argument further to make a case for an international lender of last
resort.
Our model also suggests that policy interventions that facilitate the ability
of agents to coordinate on the right equilibrium will prevent bank runs and
other forms of financial crisis. Deposit insurance and a guarantee of bail-out
in case of trouble by the central banks or international lender of last resort
may prevent runs. However, this may cause severe moral hazard problem
and encourage large capital inflows which in turn aggravate the problem.
Financial liberalisation thus should be implemented with care and proper
punishment strategies and appropriate monitoring of bank should be in place
to eliminate the risk of moral hazard. It is also argued that institution may
suspend convertibility (standstills) in order to prevent runs which are due to
self-fulfilling expectation. However, these policy interventions that facilitate
coordination on the right equilibrium do not make sense in models with a
unique equilibrium since bank runs are driven by fundamentals.
Another contrast is in the analysis of the role of transparency in prevent-
ing a financial crisis. In our analysis, public announcements that increase
transparency coupled with policy interventions that facilitate coordination,
lessens the possibility of bank runs. However, this is may not always be true
in models of bank runs with a unique equilibrium. Chan and Chui (2000) in
their paper which provide an extension of Morris and Shin (1998) find that
in some cases currency attacks are prevented by non-transparency. Thus the
role of transparency in unique equilibrium models are somewhat unclear.
In addition, in the event of a potential crisis emerging, our model would
argue for the involvement of a third party in providing liquidity support in
the case of panics. When the equilibrium is unique and runs reflect the value
of the fundamentals then the case for liquidity support is less strong.
5 Conclusion
We show that even with noisy signals on fundamentals, multiple equilibria
due to a coordination failure exist in models of banking. We argue that the
conditions under which this happens arise naturally in models of banking.
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